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Abstract
We construct a tractable neoclassical growth model that generates
Pareto's law of income distribution and Zipf's law of the rm size
distribution from idiosyncratic, rm-level productivity shocks. Executives
and entrepreneurs invest in risk-free assets as well as their own 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risky stocks, through which their wealth and income depend on rm-level
shocks. By using the model, we evaluate how changes in tax rates can
account for the evolution of top incomes in the U.S. The model matches
the decline in the Pareto exponent of the income distribution and the
trend of the top 1% income share in recent decades.
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1 Introduction
For the past three decades, there has been a secular trend of the concentration
of income among the top earners in the U.S. economy. According to Alvaredo
et al. (2013), the top 1% income share, the share of the total income accruing
to the richest 1% of the population, grew from around 8% in the 1970s to 18%
by 2010, on par with the high level of concentration in the 1930s.
Along with the increasing trend in the top income share, a widening dispersion
of income within the top income group has also been observed over the same
periods. The right tail of the income distribution is well tted by a Pareto
distribution, as known as Pareto's law of incomes. When income follows a
Pareto distribution with a slope parameter , the ratio of the number of people
who earn more than x1 to those who earn more than x2 is equal to (x1=x2)
 
for any income levels x1 and x2. Thus, the parameter , which is called the
Pareto exponent, measures the degree of equality among the rich. Notably, the
estimated Pareto exponent historically shows a close connection with the top
income share (see, e.g., Atkinson et al., 2011). The Pareto exponent declined
from 2.5 in 1970 to 1.6 in 2010, implying that a widening dispersion of income
within the top income group occurred along with a secular increase in the top
1% income share.
The purpose of this study is to develop a tractable dynamic general equilibrium
model that explains Pareto's law and to analyze the causes of income concentration
and dispersion. We pay special attention to the top marginal income tax rate
as a driving force of income dispersion among the rich, in line with Piketty
and Saez (2003). Piketty et al. (2011) report that among OECD countries, the
countries that have experienced a sharp rise in their top 1% income share are
also the ones that have reduced the top marginal income tax rate drastically.
This study examines how a decrease in the top marginal income tax rate
contributes to income concentration and dispersion in a heterogeneous-agent
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dynamic general equilibrium model.
While our main focus is on the income distribution, we require the model
to be consistent with rm-side stylized facts because a substantial part of
top income in recent decades has been derived from business income such as
corporate executive compensation and entrepreneurial income (Piketty and
Saez, 2003; Atkinson et al., 2011; Bakija et al., 2012). Although executives
and entrepreneurs are dierent in many respects, they are similar in that
their earnings strongly depend on rms' performance (Bitler et al., 2005;
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Edmans et al., 2009; Clementi and
Cooley, 2009; Frydman and Saks, 2010). This is clear for an entrepreneur,
and it increasingly holds true for an executive because of the widespread
use of stock options as a form of executive compensation (see Frydman and
Jenter, 2010 for a survey). Since a rm's performance is determined by its
productivity in standard neoclassical models, a model of the evolution of top
income in this framework should be consistent with the stylized facts of rm
productivity. One of these facts is Zipf's law of rms, which states that the rm
size distribution follows a special case of a Pareto distribution with exponent
 = 1. Zipf's law is closely related to Gibrat's law, which observes that a
rm's growth rate is independent of its size (Gabaix, 2009; Luttmer, 2010).1
For example, Luttmer (2007) generates Zipf's law from rms' idiosyncratic
productivity shocks in standard models. We construct our model in line with
this literature.2
The contribution of this study is summarized as follows. First, we present
a parsimonious neoclassical growth model that generates Zipf's and Gibrat's
laws of rms and Pareto's law of incomes from idiosyncratic, rm-level productivity
shocks. In the model, the dispersion of rm size and value solely results from
the rm-level productivity shocks. Executives and entrepreneurs (collectively
1Some deviations from Gibrat's law are reported for young and small rms, as pointed
out by Gabaix (2009) and Luttmer (2010). However, since our focus is on the right tail
of income that is mainly aected by large productive rms, we set aside this issue in our
analysis.
2Our model is consistent with another observation that the rm productivity distribution
also follows a Pareto distribution (Mizuno et al., 2012).
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called entrepreneurs in our model) can invest in their own rms' risky stocks
or in risk-free assets. The dispersion of entrepreneurs' income is determined
by the risk taken with their after-tax portfolio returns. To develop the model,
we introduce transferable product lines and nancial intermediaries that are
new to the literature. The model is simple enough to allow for the analytical
derivation of the stationary distributions of rms and income. Furthermore,
the household income process is determined by partial dierential equations
(PDEs), enabling the straightforward numerical computation of an equilibrium
transition path.
Second, by using the model, we evaluate how an unanticipated and permanent
cut in the top marginal income tax rate aects the evolution of top incomes.
A tax cut that favors risky stocks relative to risk-free assets would induce
entrepreneurs to hold more risky stocks, leading to a more diusive income
process and a more dispersed distribution of entrepreneurs' income and wealth.
Similarly, the tax cut would induce managers and rms to redesign their
contracts toward an increased share of executive stock options to capture the
benet of the tax cut. To model this eect, we regard top marginal income tax
in the real world as a tax on the risky stocks of entrepreneurs' and executives'
own rms in the model, whereas taxes on equities in the real world are a tax
on risk-free assets that are converted from a large variety of risky securities by
nancial intermediaries in the model. In the transition dynamics, a one-time
tax cut leads to a slow-moving evolution of the distribution. The evolution
of the distribution is analytically derived as PDEs. By using the PDEs with
calibrated parameters, we numerically compute the transition dynamics of the
income distribution assuming that the tax cut occurred in 1970. We show
that our model matches the decline in the Pareto exponent of the income
distribution and the trend of increasing top income shares observed in the
U.S. in recent decades.
Third, we explore the general equilibrium implications of our model. Our
model implies that a tax cut has no quantitative eects on the per-capita
output and the capital{output ratio of the aggregate economy. In our model,
a cut in the tax imposed on a nancial asset does not quantitatively aect the
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return of the asset, because the asset price endogenously changes to oset the
eect of tax change. The stable asset return leads to stable per-capita output
and capital{output ratio. This irrelevance of tax relates to the well-known
property of the \new" explanation of dividend taxation (Sinn, 1991 and McGrattan
and Prescott, 2005)|namely, that a change in dividend tax alone does not
aect investment decisions. This property of the model is consistent with the
stable growth rate of per-capita GDP and of the capital{output ratio observed
in the postwar U.S. The irrelevance of tax to asset returns also produces
implications with inequality. While we share views on the importance of a
tax cut with Piketty and Saez (2003) and Piketty et al. (2011), in our model,
a cut in the top marginal income tax rate will not in itself aect the income
distribution, if there are no alternative assets. Instead, an income tax cut
relative to other taxes|such as capital gains or corporate taxes|will aect
the distribution through changes in entrepreneurs' portfolio choices. We show
that the model's predictions on portfolio choice are consistent with observed
measures of executives' incentive pay.
Our study builds on several others that investigate why the income distribution
follows a Pareto distribution. Gabaix and Landier (2008) construct a model
of executive pay. By assuming that the rm size distribution follows Zipf's
law and the CEO's talent follows a certain distribution, they show that the
CEO's pay follows a Pareto distribution. By using the model, they interpret
that rising CEO pay in the U.S. in recent decades has resulted from rising rm
values. Their model has the advantage of being consistent with both Zipf's
law of rms and Pareto's law of incomes, similar to ours. However, their
model predicts a constant Pareto exponent. Jones and Kim (2014) extend the
model to be consistent with the recent decline in the Pareto exponent of the
income distribution in the U.S. Compared to these studies, the contribution
of ours is to build a model that generates both Zipf's and Pareto's laws
from the productivity shocks of rms, without assuming particular underlying
distributions.
Another thread of the literature, dating back to Champernowne (1953) and
Wold and Whittle (1957), explains Pareto's law of incomes by idiosyncratic
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shocks on household wealth.3 Most of these studies use partial equilibrium
or endowment models that abstract from production.4 As Jones (2015) notes,
however, analyses that abstract from general equilibrium forces tend to generate
unsatisfactory comparative statics. Recently, Nirei and Aoki (2016) and Benhabib
et al. (2015) extend the framework to standard Bewley models, that is, dynamic
general equilibrium models of heterogeneous households with production, and
show that idiosyncratic shocks on rms' productivities generate Pareto's law
of incomes in the environment. Our study follows this approach. In our model,
behaviors of both households and rms are essential in determining Pareto's
law. Compared with previous studies, we feature a model that explains not
only Pareto's law of incomes but also Zipf's law of rms, both generated from
the productivity shocks of rms. Previous studies can explain only one of these
laws, because the entrepreneur of a rm possesses all of the rm's capital and
thus the entrepreneur's wealth becomes proportional to the rm's size. We
resolve this problem by incorporating the entrepreneur's portfolio choice into
the model, in which an entrepreneur owns only a part, not all, of the rm's
residual claim. This feature of the model characterizes our explanation as to
how the recent tax cut has aected the evolution of top incomes.
The closest studies to ours are perhaps Kim (2013) and Jones and Kim
(2014). Kim (2013) builds a human capital accumulation model with idiosyncratic
shocks that generate Pareto's law of incomes and analyzes the impact of the
cut in top marginal income tax in recent decades on the Pareto exponent of the
income distribution. Jones and Kim (2014) extend the human capital model to
an endogenous growth setting, incorporating creative destruction. In contrast
to their studies, we build a model that also explains Zipf's law of rms.5 The
3This approach requires some additional features to prevent the income and wealth
distributions from diverging in order to obtain Pareto's law. The overlapping generations
setting used by Dutta and Michel (1998) and Benhabib et al. (2011 and 2016), and the lower
bound on savings used in Nirei and Souma (2007), Nirei and Aoki (2016) and Benhabib et al.
(2015) are examples of the features that prevent the distribution from diverging.
4Exceptions include Dutta and Michel (1998) and Toda (2014) who construct general
equilibrium models with production. The properties of these models are similar to those of
endowment models, as they are AK (and AL) type models in which the asset returns and
wage income are independent of allocation in production.
5Kim (2013) does not consider the rm-side problem. In Jones and Kim (2014),
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model predictions also dier. For example, an income tax cut in their model
encourages human capital accumulation among top income earners, resulting
in a higher per-capita output in the U.S. in recent decades than in previous
periods or in other countries such as France. By contrast, in our model, an
income tax cut does not directly aect capital accumulation.
Finally, our model is closely related to the general equilibrium models
of rm size distribution that explain Zipf's law of rms (for a survey, see
Luttmer, 2010). Following the literature, we generate Zipf's law of rms
through Gibrat's law and a minimum limit of rms. As an extension of
this literature, we devise a model of rms with multiple product lines and
entrepreneur-specic shocks that yields a reected random growth in rm size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
dynamic general equilibrium model. Section 3 discusses the rm-side properties
of the model and derives Zipf's law of rms. Section 4 describes the aggregate
dynamics of the model and denes the equilibrium. Section 5 illustrates how
the household wealth and income distributions follow a Pareto distribution
in the steady state. Section 6 analyzes how a tax cut aects top incomes in
our model and compares the results with the data. Finally, in Section 7, we
present our concluding remarks.
2 Model
We build a Bewley economy with a continuum of households (workers and
entrepreneurs), a continuum of rms, and nancial intermediaries. A simple
sketch of the model is as follows. Each rm has a continuum of products.
Firms can trade the products, by which they maintain the minimum number
of employees that is exogenously imposed. Each rm bears an idiosyncratic
productivity shock that is specic to entrepreneurs who manage the rm.
Thus, the idiosyncratic shock hits the production of all the products of a rm.
This property results in Gibrat's law, which generates Zipf's law of rm size
the entrepreneurs' income distribution becomes proportional to the rm size distribution
because each entrepreneur acquires all of the rms' rent.
7
by combining with the minimum rm size requirement. Competitive nancial
intermediaries convert a proportion of risky stocks into risk-free assets. Entrepreneurs
are compensated by stocks, and they choose how to divide their portfolio
between risky stocks and risk-free assets. The value of the stocks depends on
the rms' idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Thus, the productivity shocks
generate Pareto distributions of entrepreneurs' wealth and income. In this
environment, income tax aects the Pareto distribution through the portfolio
choice of the entrepreneurs. In what follows, we present a formal dynamic
general equilibrium model and derive the PDEs that describe the transition of
the wealth distribution.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households with measure 1. As in Blanchard (1985),
each household is discontinued by a Poisson hazard rate  and is replaced by a
newborn household that has no bequest.6 Households participate in a pension
program. If a household dies, all of its non-human capital is distributed to
living households. A living household receives the pension premium rate 
times its nancial assets.
Households consist of entrepreneurs and workers. Measure E of households
are entrepreneurs and the remaining 1   E are workers. An entrepreneur
as well as a worker provides one unit of labor and earns wage income wt.
Households also receive a government transfer tr t. Among these households,
only entrepreneurs manage rms. An entrepreneur has the benet of holding
the stocks of his rm relatively cheaper, as is explained subsequently. Whether
a household is born as an entrepreneur or a worker is exogenously determined.
An entrepreneur stochastically switches to a worker at constant hazard rate
pf .
7 Hence, there are two types of workers: workers who were born as workers,
whom we call innate workers, and workers who were born as entrepreneurs,
6Our model assumes away the bequest motive of households. A justication for the
assumption is that as Kaplan and Rauh (2013) argue, \[t]hose in the Forbes 400 are less
likely to have inherited their wealth or to have grown up wealthy."
7It is possible to extend the model by incorporating the transition of a worker to become
an entrepreneur.
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whom we call former entrepreneurs.8
Household i chooses sequences of consumption ci;s and an asset portfolio
to maximize the expected discounted log utility
Et
Z 1
t
e (+)s ln ci;s ds;
where  is the discount rate. A worker holds his wealth in (i) a risk-free
bond bi;t and (ii) human capital ht that consists of current and future wage
incomes wt and government transfers tr t. The risk-free bond yields return r
f
t
(and pension premium ) with certainty. The human capital is dened by
ht 
R1
t
(wu + tru)e
  R ut (+rfs )dsdu, whose return is
( + rft )ht = (wt + tr t) + dht=dt:
An entrepreneur can hold (iii) risky stocks of his rm si;t as an asset in
addition to (i) and (ii). Let qi;t and di;t be the price and dividend of the risky
stocks, respectively. Then, the return on the risky stock is described by the
following stochastic process:
((1   e)di;tdt+ dqi;t)=qi;t = q;tdt+ q;tdBi;t;
where  e is the tax rate on the risky stock, Bi;t is the Wiener process, and
q;t and q;t are endogenous parameters determined in equilibrium. Note that
the risky stocks obtained by entrepreneurs in the model capture the incentive
scheme for executive compensation in the real world. Therefore, we calibrate
the tax on risky stocks  e by the top marginal income tax rate in our numerical
analysis. In Section 6.7, we compare our formulation of executive pay with
that in previous studies and compare our model's prediction with the data.
Let ai;t  si;tqi;t+ bi;t+ht denote the wealth of a household (we refer to the
8 In the model, either the death rate  or the rate of exiting entrepreneur pf must be
strictly positive in order to generate Pareto's law of incomes. We introduce both types of
hazard events for a quantitative reason. Without either of these two types, the mobility
of a household's wealth or income level becomes very slow, or the Pareto exponent of the
income distribution becomes very low, compared with the data (see Gabaix et al., 2015 and
Jones and Kim, 2014).
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sum of assets as wealth) and xi;t  si;tqi;t=ai;t the share of risky stocks. The
household's wealth accumulates according to the following process:
dai;t = ((si;tqi;t + bi;t) + q;tsi;tqi;t + r
f
t bi;t + ( + r
f
t )ht   ci;t)dt+ q;tsi;tqi;tdBi;t
= a;tai;tdt+ a;tai;tdBi;t; (1)
where
a;t   + q;txi;t + rft (1  xi;t)  ci;t=ai;t
a;t  q;txi;t:
Note that dBi;t forms a multiplicative shock to the current wealth level ai;t.
Let V i denote the value function of household characteristics i, where i = e
if the household is an entrepreneur, i = ` if he is a worker, i = w if he is an
innate worker, and i = f if he is a former entrepreneur. An innate worker
w and a former entrepreneur f do not change their household characteristics
(i.e., i0 = i, where i0 denotes the characteristics in the next period), while an
entrepreneur e may change to f in the next period. Let St denote a set of
aggregate state variables dened in Section 4. By using these notations, the
household's dynamic programming problem is specied as follows:
V i(ai;t;St) = max
ci;t;xi;t
ln ci;tdt+ e
 (+)dt
Et[V
i0(ai;t+dt;St+dt)] (2)
subject to (1).
The household problem is a variant of Merton's dynamic portfolio problem
(Campbell and Viceira, 2002 for a reference). It is well known that the solution
to the problem under the log utility follows the myopic rules,
xi;t =
8<:
q;t rft
2q;t
; if i = e,
0; otherwise,
(3)
vi;t = + ; (4)
where vi;t is the consumption{wealth ratio (see Appendix A for the derivations),
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and satises the transversality condition
lim
T!1
e (+)T E0

V i(ai;T ;ST )

= 0: (5)
Note that the household decision rules (3){(5) do not depend on the probability
of an entrepreneur switching to a worker pf . This property, which results from
the log utility assumption, is convenient when we numerically solve transition
dynamics.
2.2 Firms and the nancial market
A continuum of rms with measure E produces dierentiated goods. Each
rm is managed by an entrepreneur. As in McGrattan and Prescott (2005),
each rm issues shares, and owns and self-nances capital. We assume that
the ownership of a share of a rm incurs transaction costs, except for the case
where an entrepreneur directly owns stocks of his rm in the form of non-voting
shares. Financial intermediaries also own the rm's shares by bearing the
transaction costs. The nancial intermediaries combine the shares of all rms
and issue risk-free bonds to households. Thus, nancial intermediaries provide
the means for households to diversify the rms' idiosyncratic shocks. At the
competitive level of the risk-free rate, workers prefer to hold risk-free bonds
rather than to own shares by paying transaction costs. The transaction cost
is denoted by  per dividend de;t of a rm managed by entrepreneur e. Since
nancial intermediaries own all of the voting shares, rms maximize expected
prots following the interest of nancial intermediaries. Then, the market
value of a rm achieves the net present value of the after-tax prots discounted
by the risk-free rate rft . We make these assumptions to simplify the analysis.
2.2.1 Financial intermediary's problem
In this model, returns and risks on risky stocks are ex ante identical across
rms, and shocks on the risky stocks are uncorrelated with each other. Then,
a nancial intermediary maximizes residual prot by diversifying the risks on
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risky stocks and issuing risk-free assets as follows:
max
sfe;t
Et
Z E
0

(1   f )(1  )de;tdt+ dqe;t
	
sfe;tde

  rft dt
Z E
0
qe;ts
f
e;tde

;
where sfe;t is the shares of rm e owned by the nancial intermediary and 
f
is the dividend tax, which is dierent from the tax rate on risky stocks  e.
We interpret  f in the numerical analysis as a combination of capital gains
and corporate income taxes. In Section 6, we account for the evolution of top
incomes by the change in the dierence between these tax rates. The solution
of the problem leads to
rft qe;tdt = Et[(1   f )(1  )de;tdt+ dqe;t]: (6)
2.2.2 Firm's problem
Firm e owns a continuum measure n(e) portfolio of product lines, and each
product line produces a dierentiated good. The total measure of product
lines in the economy is constant and normalized to 1. Firms can buy and sell
the product lines through merger and acquisition (M&A), as we explain more
precisely later.
The product n 2 [0; n(e)] of rm e 2 [0; E] is produced with a Cobb{Douglas
production technology:
yn;e;t = zn;e;tk

n;e;t`
1 
n;e;t;
where yn;e;t is output, zn;e;t is productivity, kn;e;t is the capital input, and `n;e;t
is the labor input. The productivity of the product line evolves as
dzn;e;t = zzn;e;tdt+ zzn;e;tdBe;t;
where Be;t follows the Wiener process. Note that dBe;t does not depend on n.
That is, we assume that productivity shocks are perfectly correlated between
the product lines within rm e, but uncorrelated with shocks in other rms. A
possible interpretation of the correlation of shocks is that the shocks are caused
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by managerial decisions. Note that the productivity levels, rather than shocks,
can be dierent between product lines even within a rm. This can occur
when the initial productivity levels vary across products or when a rm buys
product lines from other rms. dBe;t is a multiplicative shock to productivity,
because the shock is multiplied by its productivity level zn;e;t. Under the
formulation, when the rm's size is proportional to its productivity, as shown
below, Gibrat's law of rms holds; that is, the growth rate of the rm is
independent of the rm's size.
The above setting is reminiscent of those in Klette and Kortum (2004) and
Luttmer (2011), who construct models of the rm heterogeneity. We construct
such a model to derive Zipf's law in a tractable way. There are a few remarks
about our model. First, the product lines in our model are continuous, while
in Klette and Kortum (2004) and Luttmer (2011), they are discrete. This
is for tractability and ease of calculation. Second, each product line incurs
productivity shocks that are common within a rm. The setting is dierent
from Klette and Kortum (2004) and Luttmer (2011), in which shocks aect the
number of product lines rms own and product lines do not incur productivity
shocks.
A rm chooses the investment level dkn;e;t and employment `n;e;t of a
product line to maximize the value of the product line qn;e;t = q(kn;e;t; zn;e;t;St):
rft q(kn;e;t; zn;e;t;St)dt =Et

max
dkn;e;t;`n;e;t
(1   f )(1  )dn;e;tdt+ dq(kn;e;t; zn;e;t;St)

:
(7)
Here, the dividend dn;e;t of the product line consists of
dn;e;tdt = (pn;e;tyn;e;t   wt`n;e;t   kn;e;t) dt  dkn;e;t;
where pn;e;t and yn;e;t are, respectively, the price and quantity of the good, kn;e;t
is the capital invested in the product line, wt is the wage rate, and  is the
depreciation rate. The value and dividends of a rm are equal to the sums of
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qn;e;t and dn;e;t over the rm's product portfolio:
qe;t =
Z n(e)
0
qn;e;t dn; and de;t =
Z n(e)
0
dn;e;t dn:
By solving the maximization problem, we obtain the following conditions
(see Appendix B for details):
MPKt  rft +  =
@pn;e;tyn;e;t
@kn;e;t
; (8)
wt =
@pn;e;tyn;e;t
@`n;e;t
: (9)
Note that in the model, the marginal product of capital (MPK) becomes the
same across product lines and between rms, because the stochastic discount
factor of nancial intermediaries is not correlated with the shock of rm e. In
addition, note that taxes do not distort MPK because the taxes in the model
are imposed on dividends. As argued in the \new view" literature of dividend
taxation (Sinn, 1991 and McGrattan and Prescott, 2005), these do not distort
MPK.
A key factor to obtain Zipf's law of rm size is to impose a minimum level
of rm size (Gabaix, 2009; Luttmer, 2010). Following Rossi-Hansberg and
Wright (2007), we assume a minimum level of employment `min for each rm,
that is, Z n(e)
0
`n;e;t dn  `min:
We assume that a rm maintains the minimum level of employment by purchasing
product lines from other rms when the rms' employment level becomes
smaller than `min. At a price equal to the value of a product line qn;e;t, all
rms are indierent between buying and selling the product line. An acquiring
rm pays the price by newly issuing stocks. For simplicity, we assume that all
rms sell a proportion of their product lines, so that the value of the product
lines sold during time [t; t+ dt] is equal to mqe;tdt. The rate m is determined
endogenously, so that the transactions of product lines clear in aggregate.
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Provided that the initial distribution of zn;e;0 within rm e is non-degenerate,
it is always possible to nd a reallocation of product lines that satises the
needs of acquiring rms.
Our model of M&A provides a convenient mechanism by which the minimum
size is maintained and, at the same time, a rm's value qe;t is linearly related to
productivity, as we show in Section 3. From this linearity, we conrm that an
acquiring rm can recover the minimum employment level `min by purchasing
product lines with values totaling qmin   qe;t.
2.3 Aggregation and market conditions
We now consider the market conditions for the aggregate economy. We use
upper-case letters to denote the aggregate variables throughout the paper.
Goods produced in the product lines are aggregated according to
Yt =
 Z E
0
Z n(e)
0
y
 1

n;e;t dnde
! 
 1
;  > 1: (10)
We assume that the aggregate good Y is produced competitively and normalize
the price of the aggregate good to 1. The other aggregate variables are simply
summed up over households or the product lines of rms. For example, let Ct
and Kt be the aggregate consumption and capital. Then, Ct 
R 1
0
ci;t di and
Kt 
R E
0
R n(e)
0
kn;e;t dnde.
The market-clearing condition for nal goods is
Ct +
dKt
dt
  Kt + 

1  Ae;txe;t
Qt

Dt =Yt;
where Ae;t is the wealth (the sum of nancial assets and human capital)
owned by entrepreneurs, Qt is the aggregate nancial asset, and Dt is the
aggregate dividends. (1  Ae;txe;t=Qt) is the share of stocks owned by nancial
intermediaries in the aggregate nancial asset. Thus, the last term on the
left-hand side of the equation indicates the proportion of the nal goods used
for transaction costs when nancial intermediaries convert the stocks into
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risk-free bonds.
The total measures of existing product lines and labor supply are normalized
to 1. Thus, the market-clearing condition for product lines isZ E
0
Z n(e)
0
dnde =
Z E
0
n(e)de = 1:
Correspondingly, the labor market-clearing condition isZ E
0
Z n(e)
0
`n;e;t dnde = 1: (11)
The market-clearing condition for the shares of rm e is
se;t + s
f
e;t =1;
where se;t is the shares owned by rm e's entrepreneur according to (3) and
sfe;t is the shares owned by nancial intermediaries. We assume that all tax
revenues are rebated to households as lump-sum government transfers in each
period. Finally, the market-clearing condition for the risk-free bonds isZ 1
0
bi;tdi =
Z E
0
qe;ts
f
e;tde:
3 Firm-Side Properties
Before we dene the equilibrium and solve the model, we review some of the
rm-side properties. Closed-form expressions for the product line variables
(`n;e;t; kn;e;t; dn;e;t) are obtained, given r
f
t . The heterogeneity of the product line
variables stems solely from productivity. We then show that the stationary
distribution of rm productivity depends only on the minimum employment
level `min and the entrepreneur measure E, and that Zipf's law of rm size is
obtained when `min is suciently small.
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3.1 Firm-side variables
We express the product line variables as functions of relative productivity,
which we denote by ~zn;e;t  z 1n;e;t=E
n
z 1n;e;t
o
. Note that E
n
z 1n;e;t
o
is the average
of z 1n;e;t over all product lines in the economy. We obtain the following relations
by using the rm's rst-order conditions (FOCs) (8) and (9), together with the
aggregation condition (10) and the labor market condition (11) (see Appendix
B for the derivations):
`n;e;t =
pn;e;tyn;e;t
pyt
=
kn;e;t
kt
=
qn;e;t
qt
= ~zn;e;t; (12)
ddn;e;t = dt~zn;e;tdt  (  1)zkt~zn;e;tdBe;t; (13)
where
pyt 

(  1)=
MPKt
 
1 
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o 1
 1
1
1 
; (14)
kt 

(  1)=
MPKt
 1
1 
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o 1
 1
1
1 
; (15)
qt  dt
Z 1
t
(1   f )(1  ) exp

 
Z u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds

du; (16)
dt  (1  (1  )(  1)=)pyt   ( + k;t) kt;
where k;t and d;t are the expected growth rates of kn;e;t and dn;e;t, respectively.
Note that the dispersion of the product line variables is solely determined by
relative productivity ~z. This property signicantly simplies the computation
of the transition paths.
3.2 Zipf's law of rm size
In this study, we measure the size of a rm by its employment. By using (12),
the employment growth of a rm is derived as
d ln `e;t =  

(  1)22z
2
+m

dt+ (  1)zdBe;t: (17)
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In the above equation,m is the measure of the product lines sold to other rms.
Given this dierential equation for rm size (employment), the Fokker{Planck
equation (also called the Kolmogorov forward equation) for the probability
density of the rm size distribution fs(ln `; t) is obtained as
@fs(ln `; t)
@t
=  

(  1)22z
2
+m

@fs(ln `; t)
@ ln `
+
(  1)22z
2
@2fs(ln `; t)
@(ln `)2
:
In this section, we solve an invariant distribution for rms. When @fs(ln `; t)=@t =
0, the Fokker{Planck equation with the constraint `e;t  `min has a solution in
an exponential form,
fs(ln `) = F0 exp(  ln `); (18)
where the coecients satisfy
F0 = `

min;  = 1 +
m
(  1)22z=2
: (19)
Equation (18) shows that the distribution of ln `e;t follows an exponential
distribution. Through a change of variables, it is shown that the distribution
of `e;t follows a Pareto distribution whose Pareto exponent is . When `e;t
follows a Pareto distribution, we obtain
1 =
Z E
0
`e;tde = E 
Z 1
`min
`e;tfs(ln `e;t)
d ln `e;t
d`e;t
d`e;t =
`min
  1 :
By rearranging this equation, we obtain
 =
1
1  `min
1=E
: (20)
This equation shows that  approaches 1 if `min is suciently small compared
with average employment per rm 1=E. Hence, we obtain Zipf's law for rms'
employment le;t as well as for rms' sales pe;tye;t or capital input ke;t, when the
minimum size of a rm is suciently small.
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4 Aggregate Dynamics and Equilibrium of the
Model
In this model, we obtain the dynamics of the aggregate variables independently
of the heterogeneities within entrepreneurs, innate workers, and former entrepreneurs.
This separation between aggregates and cross-sectional heterogeneity stems
from the model property that the household's policies are independent of its
wealth level and that the rm's policies are linear in relative productivity. We
rst summarize these properties and then dene the equilibrium of the model.
4.1 Aggregate dynamics of the model
The growth rate of the aggregate output on the balanced growth path is
g 

z   
2
z
2

+ (  1)
2
z
2

=(1  );
which is conrmed by aggregating (14). We detrend the aggregate variables by
growth rate g and denote them by tilde, for example ~Kt  Kt=

egt  E
n
z 1n;e;0
o 1
 1
1
1 

.
Let ~Ae;t, ~Aw;t, and ~Af;t denote the detrended aggregate wealth (the sum
of nancial assets and human capital) of entrepreneurs, innate workers, and
former entrepreneurs, respectively, while ~Ht is detrended aggregate human
capital. The sum of ~Ae;t, ~Aw;t, and ~Af;t is equal to the aggregate wealth of
all households ~At. We denote the set of the detrended aggregate variables by
~St  ( ~Ae;t; ~Aw;t; ~Af;t; ~Ht; ~Kt), whereas St  egt~St denotes the original aggregate
variables.
We show below that the aggregate dynamics of the detrended variables are
reduced to ordinary dierential equations:
d~St
dt
= ~S(
~St) 
 
d ~Ae;t
dt
;
d ~Aw;t
dt
;
d ~Af;t
dt
;
d ~Ht
dt
;
d ~Kt
dt
!
; (21)
and price variables (rft ; q;t; q;t) are functions of ~St. Given ~St, the aggregate
dynamics (21) and price functions are obtained through the following steps:
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1. Given ~Kt, from (15), r
f
t and MPKt are obtained by
rft +  = MPKt =
(  1)=
~K1 t
:
2. Given ~At and ~Ht, we obtain ~Ct = ( + ) ~At from (4) and ~Qt = ~At   ~Ht.
Given MPKt, ~Yt = pyt=e
gt is pinned down. Given the variables obtained
above and (3), d ~Kt=dt is, jointly with ~Dt and xe;t, computed by the
following equations,
d ~Kt
dt
=~Yt    ~Kt   ~Ct   
 
1 
~Ae;txe;t
~Qt
!
~Dt   g ~Kt;
~Dt =(1  (1  )(  1)=) ~Yt   ( + g) ~Kt   d
~Kt
dt
;
and (3). Note that q;t and q;t in (3) are the functions of ~Kt, ~Qt, and
~Dt (see Appendix B.2).
3. Given the variables obtained above, (d ~Ae;t=dt; d ~Aw;t=dt; d ~Af;t=dt) are
computed as follows:
d ~Ae;t
dt
=(ae;t   g) ~Ae;t + ( + pf )E ~Ht   ( + pf ) ~Ae;t;
d ~Aw;t
dt
=(a`;t   g) ~Aw;t + (   ( + pf )E) ~Ht    ~Aw;t;
d ~Af;t
dt
=(a`;t   g) ~Af;t + pf ~Ae;t    ~Af;t;
where ae;t and a`;t are the a;t's of an entrepreneur and a worker,
respectively, and are computed by (1) and (4). Finally, given the variables
obtained above, d ~Ht=dt is computed by
d ~Ht
dt
=  ( ~wt + ~tr t) + ( + rft   g) ~Ht; (22)
where ~wt = ((1 )( 1)=) ~Yt and ~tr t =
n
~Ae;txe;t
~Qt
 e +

1  ~Ae;txe;t~Qt

 f
o
~Dt.
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4.2 Denition of a competitive equilibrium
By using the property of the aggregate dynamics, we now dene the equilibrium
of the model. To simplify the analysis, we specify the initial conditions in the
following manner. First, the initial capital of a product line is proportional to
the product line's productivity, that is, ~kn;e;0 / ~zn;e;0. Then, the initial value of
the product line is also proportional to productivity, that is, ~qn;e;0 = ~zn;e;0 ~Q0,
where ~Q0 = ~A0   ~H0. Second, the initial rm size distribution follows (18)
and (19). Third, we assume that all stocks are initially owned by households,
and except for those held by entrepreneurs, these stocks are sold to nancial
intermediaries in period 0.9 Let sie;0 be the initial shares of rm e held by
household i (then,
R 1
0
sie;0di = 1).
A competitive equilibrium of the model, given the law of motion of the
product line's productivities fzn;e;tgt, the initial capital of product lines in
rms ~kn;e;0 / ~zn;e;0, the initial shares of rms held by households sie;0, taxes  e
and  f , and the measure of entrepreneurs E, is a set of household variables
fxi;t; vi;t; ~ai;tgi;t, price variables ~qe;0 and fwt; rft ; q;t; q;tgt, and aggregate variables
f~Stgt, such that
 the household variables fxi;t; vi;t; ~ai;tgt, where ~ai;0 =
R E
0
~qe;0s
i
e;0de + ~H0,
are chosen according to the household's decisions on (3) and (4), and the
law of motion for wealth (1), and satisfy the transversality condition (5),
 the price variables ~qe;0 and fwt; rft ; q;t; q;tgt are determined so that
markets for labor, nal goods, product lines, shares, and risk-free bonds
clear, given ~St and initial price condition ~qn;e;0 = ~zn;e;0 ~Q0,
 and the aggregate variables f~Stgt evolve according to (21).
9We assume that the sellout to nancial intermediaries is mandatory. We can relax the
assumption and allow households by paying transaction costs  to hold risky stocks of the
rms not managed by them.
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5 Stationary Distribution of Households' Wealth
In this model, stationary wealth distributions are derived analytically for
each type of household. We show below that the wealth distributions of
entrepreneurs, innate workers, and former entrepreneurs are all Pareto distributions.
We also discuss that the wealth, income, and consumption distributions of
all households follow a Pareto distribution at the upper tail, whose Pareto
exponent coincides with that of the wealth distribution of entrepreneurs.
5.1 Wealth distribution of entrepreneurs
An entrepreneur's wealth ~ae;t, if he does not die, evolves as
d ln ~ae;t =

ae   g   
2
ae
2

dt+ aedBi;t:
We omit the time subscript for variables that are constant in the steady state.
The initial wealth of entrepreneurs of age t0 in period t is ht t0 . The
logarithm of the wealth of the entrepreneurs alive at t, relative to their initial
wealth, is given by ln(ae;t=ht t0) = ln ~ae;t   (ln ~ht t0   gt0), which follows a
normal distribution with mean (ae   2ae=2)t0 and variance 2aet0.
We obtain the wealth distribution of entrepreneurs by combining the above
property with the assumption of the constant probability of death. The
probability density function of the log wealth of entrepreneurs, fe(ln ~a), becomes
a double-exponential distribution (see Appendix D for the derivations in this
section).10
fe(ln ~a) =
8<:fe1(ln ~a) 
(+pf )E

exp

  1(ln ~a  ln ~h)

if ~a  ~h;
fe2(ln ~a)  (+pf )E exp

 2(ln ~a  ln ~h)

otherwise,
10We normalize the probability density functions of entrepreneurs, innate workers, and
former entrepreneurs, namely fe(ln ~a), fw(ln ~a), and ff (ln ~a), respectively, such thatZ 1
 1
ffe(ln ~a) + fw(ln ~a) + ff (ln ~a)g d(ln ~a) = 1:
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where
 1 ae   g   
2
ae=2
2ae


ae   g   2ae=2
  1

;  2  ae   g   
2
ae=2
2ae


ae   g   2ae=2
+ 1

;
 
q
2( + pf )2ae + (ae   g   2ae=2)2:
This result shows that the wealth distribution of entrepreneurs follows a double-Pareto
distribution (Reed, 2001; Benhabib et al., 2016; Toda, 2014), whose Pareto
exponent at the upper tail is  1.
5.2 Wealth distribution of innate workers
A worker's wealth ~a`;t, if he does not die, evolves as
d ln ~a`;t = (a`   g) dt:
Under the wealth process, the probability density function of innate workers,
fw(ln ~a), becomes
fw(ln ~a) =
8<:(   ( + pf )E)
1
ja` gj exp

  
a` g (ln ~a  ln ~h)

if ln ~a ln ~h
a` g  0,
0 otherwise.
The result shows that the log wealth of innate workers follows an exponential
distribution, which implies that their wealth levels follow a Pareto distribution.
With the parameter values in the numerical analysis, the trend growth of
workers' wealth is close to the trend growth of the economy, that is, a`  g.
Then, the detrended wealth of innate workers is concentrated at the level
around ~h.
5.3 Wealth distribution of former entrepreneurs
The wealth distribution of former entrepreneurs is determined by the entrepreneurs'
wealth distribution, the Poisson rate pf with which each entrepreneur leaves
the rm, and the wealth process after the entrepreneur becomes a worker. We
can analytically derive the stationary wealth distribution of former entrepreneurs.
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Here, for brevity, we only report the probability density function of former
entrepreneurs, ff (ln ~a), for the case a`  g:
ff (ln ~a) =
8>>><>>>:
pf
  1(a` g)fe1(ln ~a) 

1
  1(a` g)   1+ 2(a` g)

pffe1(ln ~h)
 exp

  
a` g (ln ~a  ln ~h)

if ln ~a  ln ~h,
pf
+ 2(a` g)fe2(ln ~a) otherwise.
The probability density function for the region ~a  ~h consists of two exponential
terms. As the wealth level increases, the second exponential term, which
represents the innate workers' distribution, declines faster than the rst term,
the entrepreneurs' distribution. Therefore, the Pareto exponent of the former
entrepreneurs' wealth distribution becomes the same as that of entrepreneurs
in the tail of the distribution (the same result applies to the case a` < g).
5.4 Pareto exponents of the wealth and income distributions
for all households
The distributions of entrepreneurs, innate workers, and former entrepreneurs
determine the overall wealth distribution of households. We make two remarks
on the overall distribution. First, the Pareto exponent at the upper tail of
the households' wealth distribution is the same as that of the entrepreneurs'
wealth distribution  1. This is because the distribution of the smallest Pareto
exponent dominates at the upper tail as noted above (see, e.g., Gabaix, 2009).
Second, the income and consumption distributions at the upper tail also
follow the Pareto distribution with the same Pareto exponent as that of wealth
 1. This is because, in our model, the income and consumption of a household
are always proportional to the household's wealth level.
6 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we numerically analyze how a reduction in the top marginal
tax rate accounts for the evolution of top incomes in recent decades. In the
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baseline experiment, we assume that an unexpected and permanent tax cut
occurs in 1970. As a robustness check, we also conduct numerical exercises
feeding the exact time path for these taxes into our model.
We choose 1970 as the year of the structural change, based on several
empirical studies suggesting that inequality began to grow after the 1970s
(see, e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Piketty and Saez, 2003). Some political
scientists also point out that U.S. politics began to favor industries after the
1970s (Hacker and Pierson, 2010). Indeed, top marginal earned income tax
declined from 77% to 50% around 1970 alone (see Figure 1). This would make
entrepreneurs anticipate a subsequent cut in top earned income tax, the most
important variable in our analysis to account for the evolution of top incomes.
These factors suggest that a structural change has occurred since the 1970s.
In our model, a tax cut aects top incomes by changing entrepreneurs'
incentives to invest in risky stocks. In the tax parameter set we calibrate
below, the tax rate on risky stock  e becomes lower after 1970 relative to
the tax rate on the risk-free asset  f . This shift in tax structure induces
entrepreneurs to increase the share of risky stocks in their asset portfolios,
which leads to a decline in the Pareto exponent and an increase in top income
share in our model.
6.1 Tax rates
In our model, entrepreneurs' holdings of own risky stocks correspond to the
incentive pay for executives, such as employee stock options. Thus, we set
the tax on risky stocks  e in our model to be equal to the top marginal
earned income tax imposed on top executive pay. Meanwhile, the tax on
risk-free assets  f captures the taxes that households bear when they hold
equities through nancial intermediaries. Thus, we set the tax on risk-free
assets according to 1   f = (1   cap)(1   corp), where  cap and  corp are the
marginal tax rates for capital gains and corporate income, respectively. These
tax rates are calibrated by using the top statutory marginal federal tax rates
reported in Saez et al. (2012) (see Figure 1 and Table 1).
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Figure 1: Federal tax rates (percent)
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Note: The data are taken from Table A1 of Saez et al. (2012).
Table 1: Tax rates (percent)
Pre-1970 Post-1970
Earned income tax,  ord 71:8 37:9
Capital gain tax,  cap 32:3 15:0
Corporate income tax,  corp 49:0 35:0
 e 71:8 37:9
 f 65:5 44:8
Notes: The values in the upper half of the table are calibrated from the top statutory
marginal federal tax rates in Figure 1, taken from Saez et al. (2012). The tax rate on risky
stocks e is set to be equal to ord. The tax rate on risk-free assets f is calculated by
1  (1   cap)(1   corp).
6.2 Calibration
The parameters are calibrated to the annual frequency data as in Table 2. The
rst ve parameter values are standard. We assume for  that the average
length of life after a household begins working is 50 years.  is set to 3:33,
implying that 30% of a rm's sales is rent. The value of  is lower than
the standard value, because our model's treatment of entrepreneurial income
is dierent from the data|in our model, an entrepreneur's income derives
mainly from the rm's dividend, whereas in the data, executive compensation
is categorized as labor income in most situations. A lower  is chosen to
take this into account. In addition, if  is too high, the total value of an
entrepreneur's risky stocks may exceed the total value of nancial assets in
the economy, provided that entrepreneurs choose si;t according to (3). A low
 should be chosen to avoid this.
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For pf , we assume that the average term of oce of an entrepreneur or an
executive is 20 years. `min is set to unity, that is, the minimum employment
level is one person. The fraction of entrepreneurs in all households is set as
E = 0:05, implying that the average employment of a rm is 20 persons. This
is consistent with the data reported in Davis et al. (2007). Under E = 0:05,
the Pareto exponent of the rm size distribution in the model is 1=(1 0:05) 
1:0526, which is consistent with Zipf's law.11 Note that the Pareto exponent
of rm size does not depend on the tax rate. In our model, a tax cut aects
only the income distribution but not the rm size distribution, which we nd
consistent with the data.
To calibrate rm-level volatility, we consider two cases. In Case A, we
match with the average rm-level volatility of publicly traded rms, and in
Case B, we match with that of both publicly traded and privately held rms.
We match the estimates of rm-level employment volatility in Davis et al.
(2007) with the model counterpart ( 1)z. The calibrated values are shown
in Table 2. In Cases A and B, the transaction cost of nancial intermediaries
 is calibrated to match the Pareto exponent in the pre-1970 steady state with
the 1970 observation 2.53.
To cross-check the calibration of rm-level volatility using employment
data, we compare the calibrated values with the rm's asset value volatilities.
In our model, asset value volatility coincides with employment volatility ( 
1)z. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002, Table 6) report the standard
deviation of the market equity returns of all public rms between 1953 to 1999
to be 17.0% and that of the smallest decile of public rms to be 41.1%. Several
studies report the magnitude of the idiosyncratic volatility of stocks or risky
assets owned by households. Flavin and Yamashita (2002), using the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics from 1968 to 1992, nd that the standard deviation
11Note that under these parameters, for small rms, the value of an entrepreneur's risky
stock calculated by (3) exceeds the value of his rm. To resolve this problem, we assume
that such an entrepreneur jointly runs a business with other entrepreneurs, such that the
asset value of the entrepreneurs' risky stocks does not exceed the value of the joint rms.
We assume that the productivity shocks of the joint rms move in the same direction. A
possible reason for this assumption is that productivity shocks are caused by managerial
decisions.
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Table 2: Calibrated parameters
 Discount rate 0.03
 Probability of death 1=50
 Capital share 0:36
 Depreciation rate 0.06
g Steady-state growth rate 0.02
 Elasticity of substitution 3.33
pf Probability of an entrepreneur quitting 1=20
`min Minimum level of employment 1
E Share of entrepreneurs in households 0.05
Case A Case B
(  1)z Firm-level volatility of employment 25% 45%
 Transaction costs of nancial intermediaries 0.502 0.601
Notes: The values of the rm-level volatility of employment are taken from Figure 2.6 of
Davis et al. (2007). In Case A, rm-level volatility is equal to that of publicly traded rms
in the data. In Case B, rm-level volatility is equal to that of both publicly traded and
privately held rms in the data.
of stocks owned by U.S. households is 24.2%. Calvet et al. (2007) report that
the idiosyncratic volatility of assets in the portfolio of Swedish households
around 2000 is 21.1%. Fagereng et al. (2016) nd that the standard deviation
of risky assets of Norwegian households in 2013 is 23.4%. In sum, the estimates
on asset value volatilities fall near the range between Cases A and B.
6.3 Computation of transition dynamics
We compute the Pareto exponent of the household's income distribution and
the top 1% income share before and after 1970. We assume that before 1970,
the economy is in the pre-1970 steady state. In our experiment, taxes change
unexpectedly and permanently in 1970, and the economy moves toward the
post-1970 steady state.
An advantage of our model is that the dynamics of the aggregate variables
can be computed separately from the dynamics of the cross-sectional distributions.
The transition dynamics of a set of the aggregate variables, ~St  St=egt =
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( ~Ae;t; ~Aw;t; ~Af;t; ~Ht; ~Kt) dened in Section 4.1, are computed by a shooting
algorithm that pins down their initial values. When taxes change unexpectedly
in 1970, prices also change suddenly, which aects the wealth distribution.
We assume that while perfect risk-sharing for the unexpected change in asset
values is achieved for the risk-free bonds and human capital, it does not
work for the risky assets. Then, the wealth shares of entrepreneurs, innate
workers, and former entrepreneurs, namely Ae;1970=A1970, Aw;1970=A1970, and
Af;1970=A1970, change accordingly. The remaining initial variables, ~A1970 and
~H1970, are determined by using the shooting algorithm (for details, see Appendix
C.1).
Next, given the transition of the aggregate variables calculated above,
we compute the variables that determine the entrepreneurs' and workers'
wealth processes, ae;t, ae;t, and a`;t. By using these variables, the transition
dynamics of the distribution can be computed by numerically solving the
Fokker{Planck equations for the wealth distributions of entrepreneurs and
workers, fe(ln ~a; t) and f`(ln ~a; t)  fw(ln ~a; t) + ff (ln ~a; t), respectively, as
follows:12
@fe(ln ~a; t)
@t
= 

ae;t  
2ae;t
2
  g

@fe(ln ~a; t)
@ ln ~a
+
2ae;t
2
@2fe(ln ~a; t)
@(ln ~a)2
  ( + pf )fe(ln ~a; t);
@f`(ln ~a; t)
@t
=  (a`;t   g) @f`(ln ~a; t)
@ ln ~a
+ pffe(ln ~a; t)  f`(ln ~a; t):
We impose the boundary conditions that lim~a!1 fi(ln ~a; t) = 0 and that the
probability density function of the wealth distribution at the lower bound
~aLB, fi(ln ~aLB; t), moves linearly for 50 years between the pre-1970 and the
post-1970 steady-state values.13 Finally, we dene a household's income as
ai;t + q;txi;tai;t + r
f
t (1   xi;t)ai;t. The income distribution can be computed
after the aggregate dynamics and wealth distributions are obtained.
12We use the PDE solver in MATLAB. We set 44000 mesh points to ln ~a between the
lower bound ln ~aLB (see footnote 13 for details) and 110 and 500 mesh points to time t
between 1970 and 2020.
13 ~aLB is set to be higher than ~h at the pre- and post-1970 steady states.
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6.4 Aggregate transition after the tax cut
Before analyzing the evolution of the income and wealth distributions, we
rst look at the aggregate dynamics of the transition economy. An important
implication of the model is that a tax cut does not signicantly aect capital
accumulation or the capital{output ratio of the economy. This result comes
from the property that investment in capital is nanced by retained earnings.
Then, the tax change does not aect the return on stocks ((1    e)di;tdt +
dqi;t)=qi;t, because qi;t in the denominator of the equation changes to oset the
eect of tax change (1   e) in the numerator.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) plot the computed transitions of detrended per-capita
output and the capital{output ratio of the model economy under Cases A and
B. In the plot, per-capita output is normalized to 1, before the tax cut and
the transition for 50 years after the tax cut is shown. Although the variables
increase after the tax cut, we note that the magnitudes are quantitatively
negligible: for example, detrended per-capita output only increases by 1 percentage
point 20 years after the tax cut. Thus, the computed transition conrms our
prediction that a tax cut has almost no quantitative impacts on per-capita
output or the capital{output ratio.
Figures 2(c) and 2(d) plot the transition of prices. We observe that the
risk-free rate and detrended wage rate are almost unchanged after the tax cut.
This is another consequence of the fact that the tax cut has negligible eects
on capital accumulation in our model.
The prediction of the model that the tax change has negligible eects on
capital accumulation is in sharp contrast to previous models of the income
distribution such as Nirei and Aoki (2016), Toda (2014), and Kim (2013).
We note that the prediction is consistent with the facts in the U.S. that
the capital{output ratio has not changed signicantly over the post-World
War II years; nor has the level of per-capita GDP increased above the trend
line recently. In contrast to the capital{output ratio, the value of detrended
nancial asset ~Qt jumps after the tax cut, which is caused by the increase in
after-tax dividends. This mechanism is the same as the model in McGrattan
and Prescott (2005) and consistent with their interpretation on the rise in the
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equity value of U.S. rms since the 1970s.
Figures 2(e) and 2(f) show the wealth accumulation rates of entrepreneurs
and workers before and after the tax cut. Note that the gap in wealth
accumulation rates between entrepreneurs and workers signicantly and permanently
widens after the tax cut. This widened gap is caused by the increased dierence
in risky and risk-free returns. The key mechanism of rising inequality in our
model is this increased dierence between the risky and risk-free rates after
the tax cut.
6.5 Pareto exponent and the top 1% income share
Figures 3(a) and 3(c) show the Pareto exponent of the income distribution
in the calibrated model for Cases A and B, along with the historical U.S.
Pareto exponent. While we referred to the \Pareto exponent" in the model
analysis as an asymptotic exponent in the right tail distribution, we need to x
the tail range when we estimate the exponent with nite data. We calculate
the exponent from the slope of the complementary cumulative distribution
of household wealth Pr(~ai;t > ~a) between the top 0.1% and top 1% in the
calibrated model as well as in the U.S. data. We hereafter refer to this
as an \empirical Pareto exponent." For the model prediction, we plot the
stationary empirical Pareto exponents for the pre- and post-1970 periods and
the transition path of the empirical Pareto exponent between them.
We nd that in both Cases A and B, the model traces data for the empirical
Pareto exponent well. Although  is set to match the level of the empirical
Pareto exponent at the initial steady state, it is nontrivial that the model
matches both the level and the changes in the empirical Pareto exponent
afterward. For example, suppose that we need to set a low (high)  to match
the empirical Pareto exponent at the initial steady state. Then, the changes
in the empirical Pareto exponent during the transition become slower (faster)
than the data because the volatility of each entrepreneur's wealth decreases
(increases).
Figures 3(b) and 3(d) plot the top 1% income shares for Cases A and B.
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Figure 2: Response of the aggregate variables after the tax cut
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(a) Output and capital: Case A
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(b) Output and capital: Case B
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(c) Price levels: Case A
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(d) Price levels: Case B
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(e) Wealth growth rates: Case A
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(f) Wealth growth rates: Case B
Notes: Figures (a) and (b) plot detrended per-capita output (the rst axis) and the
capital{output ratio (the second axis). Figures (c) and (d) plot the detrended aggregate
nancial wealth value, risk-free rate, and detrended wage rate. Figures (e) and (f) plot the
wealth growth rates of an entrepreneur and a worker, ae and aw. The horizontal axis
shows the years after the tax cut. Detrended per-capita output and prices before the tax
cut are normalized to 1.
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Figure 3: The evolution of the income and wealth distributions
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(a) Empirical Pareto exponent: Case A
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(c) Empirical Pareto exponent: Case B
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Note: Data are taken from Alvaredo et al. (2013). The empirical Pareto exponent is
calculated in the range between the top 0.1% and top 1%.
Under these specications, the model captures the trend in the top 1% share
of income after 1970, although the model's prediction of the pre-1970 steady
state is lower in level than the data reveal. Other factors, such as rewards for
executives' talents as argued by Gabaix and Landier (2008) and bargaining
and rent extraction by executives as emphasized by Piketty et al. (2011), may
account for this gap. Note that the top 1% income share in Case B increases
somewhat more slowly than that in Case A. This is because the rm's volatility
becomes higher in Case B. This makes xe;t lower by (3), which results in the
lower volatility of the entrepreneur's wealth.
In Figure 4, we plot the complementary cumulative distributions of the
household's detrended wealth Pr(~ai;t > ~a) at the pre- and post-1970 steady
states and the transition paths. We nd that the wealth distribution converges
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Figure 4: Household's wealth distributions
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(a) Case A
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Notes: The gures plot the complementary cumulative distributions of a household's wealth
Pr(~ai;t > ~a) normalized by the average wealth each year. For example, \1985 (transition)"
indicates the wealth distribution in 1985 normalized by the 1985 average wealth. The gure
on the left presents the distributions for Case A, whereas the gure on the right presents
them for Case B.
to the new distribution from the low wealth region rst, whereas the convergence
is slow in the high wealth region. We also nd that the convergence is
somewhat faster in Case A than in Case B, similar to the computed transition
of the empirical Pareto exponent.
Gabaix et al. (2015) show that standard models with random wealth growth
cannot generate the rise in inequality as fast as that observed in the data,
unless the wealth growth process includes a high growth type. Our model
is consistent with their view. In our model, the heterogeneity in the mean
wealth growth rate between entrepreneurs and workers and the probability
of an entrepreneur becoming a worker pf generate the rapid decline in the
empirical Pareto exponent.
6.6 Gradual change in tax rates
In the benchmark cases, we assume a sudden tax change in 1970. This might
seem a too convenient assumption, because the actual tax changes were more
gradual. To check the robustness of our analysis above, we compute the
34
Figure 5: The evolution of the income distribution: changing taxes
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
data
model (pre-1970 steady state)
model (transition)
model (post-1970 steady state)
(a) Empirical Pareto exponent: Case A
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
data
model (pre-1970 steady state)
model (transition)
model (post-1970 steady state)
(b) Top 1% income share: Case A
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
data
model (pre-1970 steady state)
model (transition)
model (post-1970 steady state)
(c) Empirical Pareto exponent: Case B
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
data
model (pre-1970 steady state)
model (transition)
model (post-1970 steady state)
(d) Top 1% income share: Case B
Note: Data are taken from Alvaredo et al. (2013).
transition path under the exact time series of the tax rates. Owing to the
log utility, in which a household's decision rule is myopic, the model economy
can be computed in the same way as before. The results are shown in Figure
5 and are similar to the benchmark cases.
6.7 Incentive pay for executives
In reality, executives obtain incentive pay such as stock options, whose value
moves in line with the rm's performance. In our model, this is represented
by entrepreneurs holding risky stocks of their rms. Here, we discuss whether
our formulation is realistic.
Our formulation of executive pay is similar to those of Edmans et al.
(2009) and Edmans et al. (2012). These studies theoretically derive that under
35
the optimal incentive scheme in a moral hazard problem, as in our model, a
proportion of the executive's wealth, denoted by xe;t in our model, is invested
in his rm's stocks. Moreover, Edmans et al. (2009) nd evidence that an
empirical counterpart of xe;t, (23), is cross-sectionally independent of rm size.
This property is satised in theirs and in our models.
We can also check whether the value of xe;t in our model is quantitatively
consistent with the empirical estimate. An empirical counterpart of xe;t is
computed by
x% increase in the executive's wealth
1% increase in rm rate of return
; (23)
because from (1),
xe;t =
d(ae;t)=ae;t
q;tdt+ q;tdBe;t
:
Clementi and Cooley (2009) estimate (23) from CEO compensation data in the
U.S. for 1993{2008 provided by the EXECUCOMP database. The empirical
value of (23) ranges from 1.14 to 1.24 (see Table 3). In our calibration, xe;t in
the post-1970 steady state is 1.53 for Case A and 0.99 for Case B. Therefore,
the empirical value of xe;t is between those of Case A and Case B.
Related to xe;t, Edmans et al. (2009) dene and provide empirical estimates
of a wealth{performance sensitivity measure, which they refer to as BI :
BI  x% increase in the CEO's wealth
1% increase in rm rate of return
 the CEO's wealth
the CEO's pay
: (24)
BI is a slight modication of (23). Edmans et al. (2009) report that the
empirical BI measured in 1999 is 9.04 (Table 3). In our model, BI in the
post-1970 steady state is 12.71 for Case A and 8.45 for Case B.14 The empirical
values of BI can also be calculated from the long-run data on CEO pay by
14The model's counterpart of BI in (24) is calculated from
d(ae;t)=ae;t
q;tdt+ q;tdBe;t
ae;t
ai;t + q;txi;tai;t + r
f
t (1  xi;t)ai;t
=
xe;t
a;t +  + 
:
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Table 3: Incentive elasticities
Case A Case B
xe;t (Pre-1970) 0.71 0.45
xe;t (Post-1970) 1.53 0.99
BI (Pre-1970) 8.16 5.16
BI (Post-1970) 12.71 8.45
Data
xe;t (1993{2008) 1.14{1.24
BI (1961{2005) 5.04
BI (1999) 9.04
Notes: For the denitions, see (23){(24). The values for xe;t (1993{2008) are the estimates by
Clementi and Cooley (2009). BI (1961{2005) is computed from Figures 5 and 6 in Frydman
and Saks (2010). For BI (1999), the estimate is provided by Edmans et al. (2009).
Frydman and Saks (2010).15 Because the long-run values of BI calculated
from the data of Frydman and Saks (2010) are stable for 1961{2005, we only
show the mean in Table 3. The empirical value, 5.06, is close to our model's
pre-1970 steady state values of BI , 8.16 for Case A and 5.16 for Case B.
There are also dierences between our model and the models of Edmans
et al. (2009) and Edmans et al. (2012). In their models, a single structural
parameter, the disutility of eort, aects the proportion of an entrepreneur's
wealth invested in his rm's stocks. By contrast, several factors aect this
proportion in our model; for example, an increase in the volatility of rm
value decreases the proportion of an entrepreneur's total wealth invested in
risky stocks xe;t (see (3)). This prediction is consistent with the evidence
surveyed in Frydman and Jenter (2010, Section 2.3).
6.8 Welfare analysis
To investigate how the tax change aected the welfare of households, we
calculate the utility level of an entrepreneur and an innate worker (that is, a
worker from the beginning of his life) in the pre- and post-1970 steady states.
Table 4 shows the detrended initial utility level, dened by V i(~h;S), under
Cases A and B (for the details of the derivations, see Appendix E).
In both cases, the utility level of an entrepreneur becomes higher in the
15The values are calculated by dividing the \dollar change in wealth for a 1% increase in
the rm's rate of return" by \total compensation," both of which are taken from Figures 5
and 6 of Frydman and Saks (2010).
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Table 4: Welfare analysis
Case A
V e(~h;S) V w(~h;S)
Pre-1970 8.66 7.21
Post-1970 12.01 6.74
Case B
V e(~h;S) V w(~h;S)
Pre-1970 7.73 6.25
Post-1970 10.96 5.96
Notes: The table calculates the detrended initial utility level of an entrepreneur and an
innate worker at the pre- and post-1970 steady states. The detrended initial utility level is
dened by V i(~h;S). The table on the left presents these calculations for Case A, whereas
the table on the right presents them for Case B.
post-1970 steady state, whereas that of an innate worker becomes lower. These
results are consistent with the view that the rich have beneted from the tax
change at the expense of the poor.
7 Conclusion
We proposed a model of wealth and income inequalities that explains both
Zipf's law of rms and Pareto's law of incomes from the idiosyncratic productivity
shocks of rms. Empirical studies show that the Pareto exponent of income
varies over time, whereas Zipf's law of rm size is stable. This paper consistently
explains these distributions with an analytically tractable model. We derive
closed-form expressions for the stationary distributions of rm size and individual
income. The transition dynamics of those distributions are also explicitly
derived and are then used for the numerical analysis.
Our model features an entrepreneur who can invest in his own rm as well
as in risk-free assets. The entrepreneur incurs a substantial transaction cost
if he diversies the risk in his portfolio returns. When a tax on risky returns
is reduced, the entrepreneur increases the share of his own rm's stock in his
portfolio. This, in turn, increases the variance of his portfolio returns, resulting
in a wider dispersion of wealth among entrepreneurs.
By calibrating the model, we analyzed the extent to which changes in tax
rates account for the recent evolution of top incomes in the U.S. We nd
that the model matches the decline in the Pareto exponent of the income
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distribution and the trend in the top 1% income share.
There remain some discrepancies between the model and data. First, the
model's prediction of the top 1% income share is somewhat lower than that
seen in the data. Second, we did not attempt to account for top wealth
shares. Note that in our model, the tail exponent of the wealth distribution is
identical to that of the income distribution. This may seem counterfactual at
rst. However, it is important to note that the total wealth of a household in
our model includes both nancial and human assets. A quantitative analysis
of the wealth distribution needs to be left for future research, which would
appropriately take into account human wealth in the estimation.
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A Derivations of the household problem
This appendix shows the derivations of the household problem in Section 2.1.
As shown in Section 4.1, the aggregate dynamics of the model are described
by St, whose evolution can be written as
dSt = S(St)dt:
From Ito's formula, V i(ai;t;St) can be rewritten as follows:
dV i(ai;t;St) =
@V it
@ai;t
dai;t +
1
2
@2V it
@a2i;t
(dai;t)
2 +
@V it
@St
 dSt
+
 
V `(ai;t;St)  V i(ai;t;St)

dJi;t;
where Ji;t is the Poisson jump process that describes the probability of an
entrepreneur leaving his rm and becoming a worker.
dJi;t =
8<:0 with probability 1  pfdt1 with probability pfdt.
Thus,
Et[dV
i
t ]
dt
= a;tai;t
@V it
@ai;t
+
(a;tai;t)
2
2
@2V it
@a2i;t
+ 0S(St) 
@V it
@St
+ pf
 
V `t   V it

;
where 0S(St) is the transposed vector of S(St). By substituting into (2), we
obtain a Hamilton{Jacobi{Bellman equation as follows:
0 = max
ci;t;xi;t
ln ci;t   ( + )V it + a;tai;t
@V it
@ai;t
+
(a;tai;t)
2
2
@2V it
@a2i;t
+ 0S(St) 
@V it
@St
+ pf
 
V `t   V it

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= max
ci;t;xi;t
ln ci;t   ( + )V it +
2q;t
2
x2i;ta
2
i;t
@2V it
@a2i;t
+ (( + q;t)xi;tai;t + ( + r
f
t )(1  xi;t)ai;t   ci;t)
@V it
@ai;t
+ 0S(St) 
@V it
@St
+ pf
 
V `t   V it

: (25)
The FOCs with respect to ci;t and xi;t are summarized as follows:
c 1i;t =
@V it
@ai;t
; (26)
xi;t =
8<: 
@V it =@ai;t
(@2V it =@a2i;t)ai;t
q;t rft
2q;t
; if i = e,
0; otherwise.
(27)
Furthermore, (25) has to satisfy the transversality condition (5).
Following Merton (1969) and Merton (1971), this problem is solved by the
following value function and linear policy functions:
V it = B
i
t ln ai;t +H
i(St); (28)
ci;t = vi;tai;t;
qi;tsi;t = xi;tai;t;
bi;t = (1  xi;t)ai;t   ht:
We obtain this solution by guess{and{verify. The FOC (26) becomes
(vi;t)
 1 = Bit:
Condition (27) is rewritten as
xi;t =
8<:
q;t rft
2q;t
; if i = e;
0; otherwise.
Substituting these results into (25), we nd that
vi;t = + :
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B Derivation of the rm problem
B.1 FOCs of the rm problem
This appendix shows the derivations of the rm problem described in Section
2.2.2. The value of a product line qn;e;t = q(kn;e;t; zn;e;t;St) is a function of
kn;e;t, zn;e;t, and the aggregate dynamics St (see Appendix A). By applying
Ito's formula to qn;e;t, we obtain
dq(kn;e;t; zn;e;t;St) =

@qn;e;t
@zn;e;t
dzn;e;t +
@qn;e;t
@kn;e;t
dkn;e;t +
@qn;e;t
@St
 dSt

+
1
2
@2qn;e;t
@z2n;e;t
(dzn;e;t)
2
=

z
@qn;e;t
@zn;e;t
+
1
2
2z
@2qn;e;t
@z2n;e;t

dt+
@qn;e;t
@kn;e;t
dkn;e;t
+ 0S(St) 
@qn;e;t
@St
+ z
@qn;e;t
@zn;e;t
dBe;t:
From the above equation, the FOCs of (7) for `n;e;t and dkn;e;t are
(1   f )(1  ) = @qn;e;t
@kn;e;t
;
wt =
@pn;e;tyn;e;t
@`n;e;t
:
By the envelope theorem,
rft
@qn;e;t
@kn;e;t
dt =(1   f )(1  )

@pn;e;tyn;e;t
@kn;e;t
dt  dt

:
By rearranging the equation, we obtain
rft =
@pn;e;tyn;e;t
@kn;e;t
  :
B.2 Firm-side variables
This appendix briey explains the derivations of the rm-side variables described
in Section 3.1 and used in Section 4.1. Our goal here is to rewrite the rm-side
variables as the functions ofMPKt and exogenous variables. The basic strategy
is as follows:
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1. From FOCs (8) and (9), we rewrite kn;e;t and `n;e;t as the functions of
MPKt, wt, Yt, and exogenous variables.
From (9),
wt = (1  )(  1)= Y 1 ( 1)=t z( 1)=n;e;t k( 1)=n;e;t `(1 )( 1)= 1n;e;t :
Rewriting this,
`n;e;t =

(1  )(  1)=
wt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t z
( 1)=
n;e;t k
( 1)=
n;e;t
 1
1 (1 )( 1)=
:
(29)
On the other hand, from (8),
MPKt = (  1)= Y 1 ( 1)=t z( 1)=n;e;t k( 1)= 1n;e;t `(1 )( 1)=n;e;t : (30)
By substituting (29) into (30) and rearranging,
k
( 1)=
1 (1 )( 1)=
n;e;t =

(  1)=
MPKt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 ( 1)=
1 ( 1)=


(1  )(  1)=
wt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 ( 1)=(1 )( 1)=
(1 ( 1)=)(1 (1 )( 1)=)
z

( 1)=
1 ( 1)=
n;e;t ; (31)
where   ( 1)=
1 (1 )( 1)= . Substituting (31) into (29),
`n;e;t =

(  1)=
MPKt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 ( 1)=
1 ( 1)=


(1  )(  1)=
wt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 1 ( 1)=
1 ( 1)=
z 1n;e;t (32)
2. By using the labor market condition (11), we remove wt from these
equations.
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By substituting (32) into the labor market condition (11) and rearranging,
(  1)=
MPKt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 ( 1)=
1 ( 1)=


(1  )(  1)=
wt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 1 ( 1)=
1 ( 1)=
=
1
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o ; (33)
or,

(1  )(  1)=
wt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 (1 )( 1)=
1 ( 1)=
=
8<:

(  1)=
MPKt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 ( 1)=
1 ( 1)= 1
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o
9=;
(1 )( 1)=
1 ( 1)=
: (34)
Here, E is the operator of the cross-sectional average of all rms. Then,
substituting (33) into (32),
`n;e;t =
0@ z 1n;e;t
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o
1A : (35)
Rewriting (31),
kn;e;t =

(  1)=
MPKt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 1 (1 )( 1)=
1 ( 1)=


(1  )(  1)=
wt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 (1 )( 1)=
1 ( 1)=
z 1n;e;t: (36)
Substituting (34) into (36),
kn;e;t =

(  1)=
MPKt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 1
1 ( 1)=

0BB@ z 1n;e;t
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o (1 )( 1)=
1 ( 1)=
1CCA : (37)
3. By using the results, the production function, and the aggregate good
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function (10), we remove Yt from the equations of the rm-side variables.
Substituting (35) and (37) into yn;e;t = zn;e;tk

n;e;t`
1 
n;e;t and rearranging,
yn;e;t =

(  1)=
MPKt
Y
1 ( 1)=
t
 
1 ( 1)=

0BB@ z
1
1 ( 1)=
n;e;t
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o (1 )
1 ( 1)=
1CCA :
Substituting this equation into Yt =
R E
0
R n(e)
0
y
( 1)=
n;e;t dnde
 1
( 1)=
,
Y
1 ( 1)=
t =

(  1)=
MPKt
(1 ( 1)=)
1 
 E
n
z 1n;e;t
o(1 ( 1)=)[ 1 ( 1)=(1 )( 1)= 1]
: (38)
Substituting (38) into (37),
kn;e;t =

(  1)=
MPKt
 1
1 
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o 1
 1
1
1 
0@ z 1n;e;t
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o
1A
=

(  1)=
MPKt
 1
1 
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o 1
 1
1
1 
`n;e;t: (39)
Substituting (35) and (39) into (38),
pn;e;tyn;e;t = Y
1 ( 1)=
t y
( 1)=
n;e;t (40)
=

(  1)=
MPKt
 
1 
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o 1
 1
1
1 
0@ z 1n;e;t
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o
1A
=

(  1)=
MPKt
 
1 
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o 1
 1
1
1 
`n;e;t: (41)
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Rewriting (35),
`n;e;t = `t z
 1
n;e;t; where `t 
0@ 1
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o
1A :
Rewriting (41),
pn;e;tyn;e;t = pyt`t z
 1
n;e;t; where pyt 

(  1)=
MPKt
 
1 
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o 1
 1
1
1 
:
Rewriting (39),
kn;e;t = kt`tz
 1
n;e;t; where kt 

(  1)=
MPKt
E
n
z 1n;e;t
o 1
 1
 1
1 
: (42)
We obtain `n;e;t, pn;e;tyn;e;t, and kn;e;t (12){(15). To compute ddn;e;t, we rst
need to compute dkn;e;t.
4. We compute dkn;e;t as follows. From (42),
dkn;e;t = d(kt`tz
 1
n;e;t)
=
dkt`t
dt
z 1n;e;tdt+ kt`t dz
 1
n;e;t:
Note that
dz 1n;e;t =

(  1)

z   
2
z
2

+
(  1)22z
2

z 1n;e;tdt+ (  1)zz 1n;e;tdBe;t:
Then,
dkn;e;t = d(kt`tz
 1
n;e;t)
=
dkt`t
dt
z 1n;e;tdt+ kt`t dz
 1
n;e;t
= kn;e;t fk;tdt+ (  1)zdBe;tg :
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Here,
k;t g   1
1  
drft =dt
MPKt
and g 

z   
2
z
2

+ (  1)
2
z
2

=(1  ):
5. We obtain ddn;e;t (13) by substituting these results into the following
relationship:
ddn;e;t =(pn;e;tyn;e;t   wt`n;e;t   kn;e;t)dt  dkn;e;t
=(1  (1  )(  1)=)pn;e;tyn;e;tdt  kn;e;tdt  dkn;e;t:
Then, ddn;e;t is rewritten as follows:
ddn;e;t = dt`tz
 1
n;e;tdt  kt`tz 1n;e;t(  1)zdBe;t;
where dt  (1  (1  )(  1)=)pyt   ( + k;t) kt:
We obtain qn;e;t (16) through the following steps. Here, we allow taxes to
change for the numerical analysis and add time subscript t to take into account
tax changes.
6. By multiplying (6) by e 
R u
t r
f
s ds and integrating,16 we obtain
qn;e;t =
Z 1
t
Et
h
(1   fu )(1  )dn;e;ue 
R u
t r
f
s ds
i
du
=
Z 1
t
(1   fu )(1  )e 
R u
t r
f
s ds Et [dn;e;u] du:
16The Ito process version of integration by partsZ T
t
XsdYs = XtYt  XtYt  
Z T
t
YsdXs  
Z T
t
dXsdYs
is used here. Dene t;u  e 
R u
t
rfs ds. Then,Z 1
t
t;udqn;e;u = qn;e;ut;u j1t  
Z 1
t
qn;e;u( rfu)t;udu:
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7. Et[dn;e;u] in the above equation is further computed as follows:
Et[dn;e;u] =du`u Et[z
 1
n;e;u]
=dt`t
du`u
dt`t
 exp
Z u
t

(  1)

z   
2
z
2

+
(  1)22z
2

ds

 z 1n;e;t
=dt`tz
 1
n;e;t exp
Z u
t

d ln(ds`s)
ds
+ (  1)

z   
2
z
2

+
(  1)22z
2

ds

=dt`tz
 1
n;e;t exp
Z u
t
d;sds

; where d;t  d ln dt
dt
:
By using this equation, we obtain (16):
qn;e;t =qt`tz
 1
n;e;t; where qt  dt
Z 1
t
(1   fu )(1  ) exp

 
Z u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds

du:
Note that if (rft   d;t) and taxes are constant as in the steady state,R1
t
exp
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
	
du = 1=(rf   g) and
qe;t =
(1   f )(1  )de;t
rf   g :
From the above results, we show the following properties that are used in
Section 4.1.
1. The aggregate detrended dividend ~Dt is obtained by aggregating dn;e;tdt
(13) and detrending by egt,
~Dt =(1  (1  )(  1)=) ~Yt   ( + g) ~Kt   d
~Kt
dt
:
Here, we use the property
1
1  
drft =dt
MPKt
=
d ~Kt
dt

~Kt:
2. Using the above relations, the return on a risky stock of rm e, f(1   et )de;tdt+ dqe;tg =qe;t,
is rewritten as the function of aggregate variables and exogenous shocks.
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First note that for each product line,
dqn;e;t =qn;e;t
d ln(dt`t)
dt
dt+ qn;e;t
dz 1n;e;t
z 1n;e;t
+ qn;e;t
8<:  (1   ft )(1  )R1
t
(1   fu )(1  ) exp
n
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
o
du
+
(rft   d;t)
R1
t
(1   fu )(1  ) exp
  R u
t
rfs   d;s)ds
	
duR1
t
(1   fu )(1  ) exp
n
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
o
du
9=; dt
=
n
 (1   ft )(1  )dn;e;t + rft qn;e;t
o
dt+ qn;e;t(  1)zdBe;t:
Integrating dn;e;t (13), qn;e;t (16), and the above relation, over the product
lines of rm e, and substituting the results into the return on a risky stock
f(1   et )de;tdt+ dqe;tg =qe;t = q;tdt+ q;tdBe;t, we obtain
q;t =
8<:rft + (1   et )  (1   ft )(1  )R1
t
(1   fu )(1  ) exp
n
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
o
du
9=; ;
q;t =(  1)z

8<:1  ~Kt~Dt (1  
e
t )R1
t
(1   fu )(1  ) exp
n
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
o
du
9=; :
In order to compute the return on risky stocks from aggregate variables
and exogenoush shocks, we need to know the value ofR1
t
(1   fu )(1  ) exp
  R u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds
	
du. We calculate the value as
follows. Integrating (16), we obtainZ 1
t
(1   fu )(1  ) exp

 
Z u
t
(rfs   d;s)ds

du =
Qt
Dt
:
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C Details of the aggregate dynamics
C.1 Shooting algorithm
The initial values of aggregate total and human capital, ~A1970 and ~H1970, are
determined by using the shooting algorithm through the following steps:
1. Set gHA1970  ~H1970= ~A1970. Further, set the upper and lower bounds ofgHA1970, gHAH , and gHAL.
(a) Set ~A1970. In addition, set the upper and lower bounds of ~At, ~AH
and ~AL.
(b) Compute the dynamics of the aggregate variables as explained in
Section 4.1. If the chosen path is above the saddle path, then adjust
~A1970 down. If the chosen path is below the saddle path, then adjust
~A1970 up.
(c) By repeating the procedure, we obtain an appropriate ~A1970.
2. Find year T where the distance of ( ~KT ; ~CT ) is closest to the post-1970
steady state-values, ( ~K; ~C).
3. Compute gHAT . If the gHAT is above the post-1970 steady-state value,
then adjust gHA1970 down. Otherwise, adjust gHA1970 up.
4. By repeating the procedure, we obtain an appropriate gHA1970.
Note that since ~Ct = vi;t ~At, the above procedure is similar to the shooting
algorithm used in standard growth models. To compute the variables used
below, we assume that after time T , when the dynamics of Kt and Ct are
the closest to the post-1970 steady state, the economy switches to that steady
state.
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D Derivations of the household wealth distributions
in the steady state
This appendix shows the derivations of the household wealth distributions
described in Section 5.
D.1 Wealth distribution of entrepreneurs
The discussion in Section 5.1 indicates that the probability density function
of entrepreneurs aged t0 with a detrended log total wealth level of ln ~ai is
fe(ln ~aijt0) = 1p
22aet
0 exp
 
 (ln ~ai   (ln
~h+ (ae   g   2ae=2)t0))2
22aet
0
!
:
The probability density function of entrepreneurs whose age is t0 is
fe(t
0) =(( + pf )E) exp ( ( + pf )t0) :
By combining them, we can calculate the probability density function of
the entrepreneurs' wealth distribution, fe(ln ~ai), by
fe(ln ~ai) =
Z 1
0
dt0 fe(t0)fe(ln ~aijt0):
To derive fe(ln ~ai) in Section 5.1, we apply the following formula to the above
equation:Z 1
0
exp( at  b2=t)=ptdt =
p
=a exp( 2jbjpa); for a > 0.
D.2 Wealth distribution of innate workers
We calculate the wealth distribution of innate workers as follows:
fw(ln ~ai) =fw(t
0)fw(ln ~aijt0)
 dt0d ln ~ai

= (   ( + pf )E) exp( t0)  1(ln ~ai = ln ~h+ (a`   g)t0)  1ja`   gj
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=8<:(   ( + pf )E)
1
ja` gj exp

  
a` g (ln ~ai   ln ~h)

if ln ~ai ln
~h
a` g  0,
0 otherwise.
Note that 1(ln ~ai = ln ~h + (a`   g)t0) is an indicator function that takes 1 if
ln ~ai = ln ~h+ (a`   g)t0) and 0 otherwise.
D.3 Wealth distribution of former entrepreneurs
We derive the wealth distribution of former entrepreneurs as follows. Let
t0m  (ln ~ai   ln ~h)=(a`   g). First, we consider the case where a`  g. If
ln ~ai  ln ~h, then
ff (ln ~ai) =
Z t0m
0
dt0 pffe1(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t0) exp( t0)
+
Z 1
t0m
dt0 pffe2(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t0) exp( t0)
=
  pf
    1(a`   g)fe1(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t
0) exp( t0)
t0m
0
+
  pf
 +  2(a`   g)fe2(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t
0) exp( t0)
1
t0m
=
pf
    1(a`   g) f fe1(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t
0
m) exp( t0m) + fe1(ln ~ai)g
+
pf
 +  2(a`   g) f 0 + fe2(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t
0
m) exp( t0m)g :
By substituting the following relations into the above equation, ln ~ai   (a`  
g)t0m = ln ~h, fe1(ln ~h) = fe2(ln ~h), and t
0
m = (ln ~ai   ln ~h)=(a`   g), we obtain,
ff (ln ~ai) =
pf
    1(a`   g)fe1(ln ~ai)
 

1
    1(a`   g)  
1
 +  2(a`   g)

pffe1(ln ~h)
 exp

  
a`   g (ln ~ai   ln
~h)

:
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If ln ~ai < ln ~h,
ff (ln ~ai) =
Z 1
0
dt0pffe2(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t0) exp( t0)
=
pf
 +  2(a`   g)fe2(ln ~ai):
Next, we consider the case where a` < g. If ln ~ai  ln ~h, then
ff (ln ~ai) =
Z 1
0
dt0pffe1(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t0) exp( t0)
=
pf
    1(a`   g)fe1(ln ~ai):
If ln ~ai < ln ~h,
ff (ln ~ai) =
Z t0m
0
dt0pffe2(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t0) exp( t0)
+
Z 1
t0m
dtpffe1(ln ~ai   (a`   g)t0) exp( t0)
=
pf
 +  2(a`   g)fe2(ln ~ai)
 

1
 +  2(a`   g)  
1
    1(a`   g)

pffe1(ln ~h)
 exp

  
a`   g (ln ~ai   ln
~h)

:
E Details on the welfare analysis
In this appendix, we calculate the ex ante utilities of an entrepreneur and a
worker in the steady state, which were used in Section 6.8. The value function
is written as follows:
V i(ai;S) = B
i
t ln ai +H
i(S): (43)
We then derive the utility (value function) of a worker V w(ai;S). By substituting
(3) and (4) into (25) and rearranging, we obtain Hw(S) in (43) in the steady
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state as follows:
Hw(S) =
1
 + 

ln( + ) +
rf   
 + 

:
By using this equation, the value function of a worker in the steady state,
whose total wealth is ai, can be calculated by
V w(ai;S) =
ln ai
 + 
+Hw(S):
Next, from the above results, we derive the utility (value function) of an
entrepreneur. From (25), we obtainHe(S) in (43) in the steady state as follows:
He(S) =
1
 +  + pf

pfHw(S) + ln( + ) +
rf    + (q   rf )xe=2
 + 

:
The value function of an entrepreneur in the steady state, whose total wealth
is ai, can be calculated by
V e(ai;S) =
ln ai
 + 
+He(S):
Section 6.8 calculates the detrended utility level dened by
V i(~h;S) =
ln ~h
 + 
+H i(S):
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